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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is a case that arises out of a slip and fall on the sidewalk in front of the Blackfoot 
Municipal Poo 1 in Blackfoot, Idaho in late February. Appellants claim that the City of Blackfoot was 
negligent (1) by failing to take protective measures to remove accumulated ice on the sidewalk and 
(2) for a defective design in the sidewalk and surrounding landscape. Despite their contention, 
Appellants failed to present any evidence of negligence by the City of Blackfoot 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 25, 2008, in the early morning hours JoAn Ball slipped and fell outside of the 
Blackfoot Municipal Pool. Loma Van Hom, the Blackfoot Municipal Pool manager, testified that 
during the winters the City of Blackfoot plowed the road and sidewalk in front of the pool by 
pushing the snow onto the grass. Ms. Van Hom would routinely sprinkle ice melt on the sidewalks 
outside of the pool on winter mornings. (R. 34, Affidavit Loma Van Hom, ,r 6). On February 25, 
2008, the morning of Mrs. Ball's fall; Ms·. Van Hom arrived at the pool at approximately 3 :30'a.m. 
(R.. 34, Affidavit Loma Van Hom, 1 6). She noticed that the sidewalk was slippery and sprinkled 
ice melt on the sidewalk at least three (3) times that morning before patrons arrived. (R.. 34, 
Affidavit Loma Van Hom, 17). Ms. Van Horn observed, on that morning, that the sidewalk had 
been plowed and the snow was pushed up onto the grass. (R .. 34, Affidavit Loma Van Horn, ,r 8). 
While there was some ice, there was no accumulation of snow on the sidewalk. (R .. 34, Affidavit 
Lorna Van Horn, ,i 8.) Ms. Van Horn did not see Ms. Ball fall, but saw where she landed and called 
for emergency services. Ms. Van Hom had sprinkled ice melt that morning in the area where Mrs. 
Ball fell. (R .. 34, Affidavit Loma Van Hom, 19). 
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Mrs. Ball was a regular a1 the Blackfoot Municipal Pool, having regularly swam at the pool 
from 2004 through 2008, in the moruings between 6:00 and 7:00 a.m. (ADDM R. 4, Deposition 
JoAn Ball, pg. 35, 11. 15-23). Mrs. Ball testified lhat she went to the pool year round. (ADDM R. 
4, Deposition JoA.n Ball, pg, 36, II. 4-6). She was very familiar with the sidewalks at all times of the 
year. While using the pool during the winter, Mrs. Ball had observed the occasional ice and snow 
accumulation on the sidewalks. (ADDM R. 6, Deposition JoAn Ball, pg. 37, Jl. 18-25; pg. 3811. 1-
25). Mr. Ball confinnod the frequent presence of snow and ice when he testified as follows: 
Q, So you hnd experiences negotiating the sidewalks through all 
the seasons? 
A. Correct. 
Q. And did you ever encounter any problems with the sidewalks 
during the winter of 2003/2004? 
A, Well, 1n the wintertime you've always got soow and ice. 
(ADDM R. 7, Deposition John Frederick Ball, pg. 38, 11. 20 -25~ pg. 39, II. l-4). 
Mrs. Ball does not recall the ·morning of the accident., however, Mr. Ball observed his wife 
get out of the vehicle and say ''Beth is down.." (ADDM R. 8, Deposition John Frederick Ball, pg. 
41, 11. l-25). Then he came around his side of the veh.icJe in ti.me to see rus wife falling. (ADDM 
R. 8, Deposition John Frederick Ball, pg. 41, ll. l-25). Mr. Ball clarified that he did not see what 
Jed up to Mrs. Ball falling because he was coming around his vehicle. (ADDM R. 8, Deposition 
John Frederick Bal~ pg. 44, IL 10-21). 
Mrs. Ball does not have any knowledge of whether or not the sidewalk in question w:os 
defective. (ADDM R. 5, Deposition JoAn Ball, pg. 34, ll. 15 - 18). Mr. Ball testified that he 
believed the sidewalk had a defective design because "there's not too much slope there . .. There 
wa!n 't enough slope on the sidewalk to drain the water." (ADDM R.. 5, Depositiou John Frederick 
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BaU, pg. 49, II. l-10. However, Mr. Ball conceded that to hjs knowledge the sidewalk was not in 
violation of any building code. (ADDM R. 5, Deposition John Frederick Ball, pg. 49, 11. 11-23. 
On the morning of the fall, Ms. Van Horn had not observed aoydefect in the sidewalk where 
Mrs. Ball fell prior lo her accident. (R,34, Affidavit Loma. Van Hom, 1 l 0). Further confirming the 
Jack of any defect in the sidewalk, Rex Orgill. the Blackfoot City Building Official, testified tbat he 
was alerted of the fact that Ms. JoAn Ball had slipped and fat-Jen on the sidewalk ouLside of the 
Black fool Municipal Pool on February 2S, 2008, and instructed where Ms. Ball had fallen. (ADDM 
R. I I, Affidavit of Rex Orgill, 14). On March 9, 2010, Mr. Orgjll conducted an inspection of the 
sidewalk in front of the City of Blackfoot Municipal pool, (ADDM R. 11, Affidavit of Rex Orgill, 
15). He inspected tbe area where Ms. Ball slipped and fell on Pebruary 25, 2008. (ADDM R. 11, 
Affidavit of Rex Orgill, 1 5). The side-walk was constructed with standard width and slope. The 
walking surface did not show any signs ofspaulding or weathering. (ADDM R. 11, Affidavit of Rex 
OrgiU, ~ 5). The surface was slightly worn, yet still h.ad adequate abrasiveness to provide for non-
slip walking surface during wet weather. (ADDM R. 11, Affidavit of Rex Orgill,~ 5). He also did 
nol find any trip hazards that excee.de<l .ADA standards. (ADDM R. t I, Affidavit of Rex Orgill, 
1 S). Mr. Orgill testified tbal in bis opinion, the sidewalk where Ms. Ball fell was properly 
constructed with the correct grade and was in compliance with the applicable building codes. 
(ADDM R. I 1, Affidavit of Rex Orgill, f 6). 
JV_ ARGUMENT 
A. THE DISTRJCT COURT APPLfED THE CORRECT STANDARD OF CARE 
APPLICABLE TO A MUNICfP ALITY AS ARTICULATED IN PEARSON v. BO/SE 
CITY. 
"Municipalities are not insurers of the safety of those who use the sidewalks." See, Pearson 
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v. Boise City, 80 Idaho 494,497, 333 P.2d 998, 1000 (1959), citing Wilson v. City of Idaho Falls, 
17 Idaho 425, 105 P.1057 (1909)("mere slipperiness of a sidewalk, occasioned by smooth or level 
ice or snow, is insufficient to charge the municipality with liability for injury resulting therefrom 
where the snow or ice does not constitute an obstruction."). The standard which governs the care 
of sidewalks by a municipality was clearly defined to be a duty of"keeping streets in reasonably safe 
condition for public travel and are liable for damages for injuries sustained only in consequence of 
their negligent discharge of such duty." Pearson, 80 Idaho at 496. The rationale for imposing such 
a duty is sound: 
In certain seasons and localities, as is well known, it would be burdensome, if not 
impracticable, to impose the duty on the municipality to keep its sidewaJk.s clear of 
snow and ice at all times. Pedestrians must assume the risks attending a general 
slippery condition of 1>idcwalks produced by natural causes and which remain despite 
the efforts of reasonable care and diligence. 
id. (citing McQuillio, Municipal Corporations, 3rd Ed., Vol. 19 § 54.84, p. 316) (emphasis added). 
Snow and ice is synonymous with Eastern Idaho winters and this Court has clearly established that 
a "municipality is bound to exercise only ordinary and reasonable care to maintain its strws aod 
sidewalks in a reason.ably safe condition." Id. (citing Miller v. Village of Mullan, 17 Idaho 28, 104 
P. 660 (1909)) (emphasis added). This is tbe clearly articulated standard that applies to the City's 
maintenance of its sidewalks. 
rt is, indeed, uncommon to locate a decided case from the same jurisdiction that is so 
factually analogous to the case currently being appealed. However, Pearson v. Boise City, supra, 
is so closely aligned with the present case factually that the district court had little option but to 
follow the clear precedent previously established by this Court. 
In Pearson, an elderly woman received persona.I injuries when she slipped and fe\1 on the 
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city's sidewalk. The sidewalk had sunk approximately one-half inch leaving a depression, which 
filled with water from melted snow and froze; and that falling snow covered the ice frozen in the 
depression. This condition had existed for more than three years and was known, or should have 
been known, to the city. 1 Pearson, 80 Idaho at 496. Further, the elderly woman did not allege that 
the ice obstructed the sidewalk but rather that it made the sidewalk slippery and was, therefore, a 
dangerous condition which should have been remedied by the city. The district court was 
unpersuaded by the woman's claims and dismissed her complaint, and this Court affinued. In 
coming to its conclusion, this Court declared, following an in-depth discussion of case law from 
various jurisdictions regarding defects in a sidewalk: 
The authorities are overwhelming in their holdings that a defect in a 
sidewalk of a minor or trivial nature, as shown by respondent's 
pleadings, is not sufficientto hoJd a municipality liable in damages 
for failure to repair the same. The defect in itself not being of 
sufficient serious import as to render the municipality liable for 
actionable negligence, the fact that the depression becomes filled 
with water and freezes with a surface of hard, smooth glazed ice, 
because of natural weather conditions, likewise does not 
constitute any defect for which the municipality may be held 
liable, since in such a case the ice and not any existent defect 
constitutes the proximate cause of any injury received because of 
slipping on the ice. 
Id. at 503, 333 P.2d at 1003 (emphasis added). Though the allegations in Pearson included a claim 
that there was a minor defect in the street, this Court held that hard, smooth glazed ice resulting 
from natural weather conditions does not constitute any defect for which the city may be held liable. 
1 Appellants unsuccessfully attempt to distinguish Pearson on the grounds that the City 
allegedly knew that the ice was on the sidewalk. However, this Court clearly noted that the 
condition had persisted for at least three years and that the City knew or should have know of the 
purported defect. As such, any argument that Pearson is inapplicable because the City knew of 
the ice is consistent with the level of knowledge that the city had in Pearson. 
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This Court also staled that "Pedestrians must assume the risks attending a general slippery condition 
of sidewalks produced by natural causes and which remain despite the efforts of reasonable care and 
diligence.'' Id. (ci~ng McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3m Ed., Vol. 19 § 54.84, p. 316), This 
Court further clarified that "[m}ere slipperiness of a sidew.alk, occasioned by smooth or level ice or 
snow, is insufficient to charge the mnrucipalitywith liability for injury resuJting therefrom where the 
snow and ice dae.s not constitute an obs!ruction." Id. at 497, 333 P .2d at 999-1000. As such. the 
requirement of a municipality, in ensuring a reasonably safe condition is to clear the sidewalks of 
any obstructions only. 
It is undisputed that the City of Black.foot plowed the road and sidewalk in front of the poo1 
by pushing the snow onto the grass. It is uncontroverted that the City removed any snow 
obstructions, as such, the City has complied with the cl.ear mandate from Pearson, namely that snow 
obstructions be removed. The City then went above the duly imposed by Pearson and routinely 
sprinkled ice melt on the sidewalks outside of the pool on winter mornings. (R.34, Affidavit L<:lma 
Van Hom, 16). On the rooming of the accident, Ms. Van Hom arrived at the pool at approximately 
3:30 a..m. and confirmed that the sidewalk had been plowed and the_snow was pushed up onto the 
grass that morning. (R.34, Affidavit Loma Van Hom, 1 8). While there may have been some ice, 
there was na accumu.latioo of snow on the sidewalk:: (R.34, Affidavit Loma Van Hom, 18). Ms. 
Van Hom noticed that the sidewalk was slippery. She sprinkled ice melt on the sidewalk at least 
three (3) times that morning before patrons arrived, and speci fi.caUy in the area where Mrs. Ball fell. 
(R.34, Affidavit Loma Van Horn,~?, 9). Based on tbe foregoing, it is unquestionable that the City 
made every effort to keep the sidewalks in a reasoo.ably safe condition. 
Appellants argue that the appropriate standard applicable to th!! City is that of a proprietary 
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enterprise, and more specifically, that the City maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition 
for its invitees, or to warn of hidden or concealed dangers. (Appellants' Brief, p. 9). Appellants 
argument fails for two reasons, first, the applicable standard of care is articulated in Pearson, which 
is to "exercise only ordinary and reasonable care to maintain its streets and sidewalks in a reasonably 
safe condition." Second, the standard articulated in Pearson is indistinguishable from the standard 
of care of a proprietary enterprise. 
Appellants cite Splinter v. City of Nampa, 70 Idaho 287, 215 P .2d 999 (195), a case decided 
prior to Pearson, as creating the applicable standard of care relative to the City's obligations in 
maintaining the sidewalks. Curiously, Appellants never suggest what is the applicable standard 
created by Splinter. Nonetheless, Appellants reliance on Splinter is misplaced as the case is so easily 
distinguishable when compared to the instant matter. The holding in Splinter was a hotly contested 
3-2 decision, where this Court struggled over whether or not the City of Nampa was engaged in a 
proprietary or governmental function when it allowed an adjacent private landowner to install a 
butane tank in a city alley for use by the landowner. The adjacent landowner was injured as a result 
of the proprietary activity, namely an explosion of the butane tank The court concluded that the 
granting ofa permit by the City for the placement of a tank in a City alley was a proprietary function 
and overruled the demurrer. In so concluding, this Court recognized an "illogical" and "unjustified 
anomaly" if it were to allow the City to be free from all liability based on where an injured party was 
located. The resultant conclusion was that the "degree of care to be exercised must be commensurate 
with the danger or hazard com1ected with the activity." This Court recognized that the duty of care 
was altered by the danger or hazard connected with the activity. With an increase in the danger or 
hazard of an activity, the degree of care also increase commensurate to the danger. Id. at 294, 215 
7 
P .2d at 1002 ("The highest degree of care must be exercised in connection with storing, handling, 
etc., ofhighlyinfla~able [sic] and explosive substances."). Thus, the only duty that can be derived 
from Splinter is that a municipality owes the highest duty when dealing with highly flammable 
substances. The Splinter court did not purport to define the duty of a City to maintain its sidewalks 
during winter, and no such duty can.be created from the case's holding. 
Most glaring, however, just as this Court balked at limiting liability based on the location of 
an individual in Splinter, here it would likewise be "illogical" and an "unjustified anomaly" if a 
different standard for city sidewalks were applied based upon where an individual fell. In other 
words, it is illogical to suggest that the standard of care for an individual who is walking on the 
sidewalk to use the pool and falls enjoys a different standard of care than an individual who is 
walking along the same stretch of sidewalk without intending to use the pool and falls. Such a 
distinction is both illogical and impractical. It is also illogical to suggest that an individual using a 
sidewalk:, which would be incidental to a proprietary function, would enjoy the same standard of care 
for an individual actually engaged in the proprietary function. Here, MIB. Ball was injured not while 
using the pool, a proprietary function, but rather using a sidewalk leading to the pool. The sidewalk 
is incidental to the public use of the pool. Unlike Splinter, here the injury was not the result of any 
proprietary activity but rather was incidental to such an activity. Mrs. Balls fall was not associated 
with the alleged proprietary function of the pool. As such, Appellants' reliance on Splinter is 
misplaced. 
Notwithstanding Splinter, even if this Court were to decide that a proprietary standard of an 
invitee were applicable, the appropriate standard of care for a business invitee is indistinguishable 
from the standard of care articulated in Pearson. A land owner "has not only a duty to disclose 
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dangerous conditions, blli also the duty to exercise reasonable affinnative care to keep the premises 
safe for an invitee.'' Keller v. Holiday Inns, Inc., I 05 Idaho 649, 653, 671 P .2d 11 12, 1116 ( 1983 ). 
Under this standard, the City owed a duty to "exercise reasonable affirmative care to keep the 
premises safe." The standard does not require that a landowner prevent any accident from occurring, 
rather that reaso~able efforts be taken to keep the premises safe. In Antim v. FredMeyerStores, inc. , 
1-50 Idaho 774,251 P.3d 602 (2011), a woman tripped on a mat in an aisle of a store and was injured. 
The store filed a summery judgmenl motion, which was granted by the district court, supported by 
the affidavit testimony of the store manager that he. had inspected the aisle twenty-five minutes prior 
to the fall and that the mat had been lying flat. ld. at 606. The store had inspected the area near the 
fall and there were no noticeable dangers. This Court concluded that the store acted reasonably in 
ensuring that the aisles were reasonably safe for its patrons and affirmed the lower court. It is 
undisputed that the City had io.spected the area and sprinkled ice melt on the sidewa.lks to aid in 
providing a safe ingress and egress into the pool facility. There are no facts in the record to conclude 
that the City provided anything but reasonably safe sidewalks for Mrs. Ball. Aii such, the district 
court'~ ruling was correct under either standard. 
Because the City exercised ordinary and reasonably care in maintaming the sidewalks outside 
the Bingham County Pool in a reasonably s.af e condition, and Appellaots failed to present any 
evidence to suggest otherwise, the district court's grant of summary judgment was proper. 
B. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT THE CITY OF BLACKFOOT NEGLIGENTLY 
MAJNT AJNED ITS SIDEWALKS. 
From the outset, as this Court has previously held, hard, smootb ·glazed ice resulting from 
natural weather conditions does not constitute any defect for which the city may be held liable. 
9 
Pearson, 80 Idaho at 503, 333 P.2d at 1003. Furthermore, one of the inherent risks to each 
individual residing in Eastern Idaho is the certainty of snow and ice on sidewalks. Here, Mm. Rall 
was on notice of ice on the sidewalk. Mrs. Ball testified that she had Dbserved ice and snow 
accumulation on the sidewalks at the Blackfoot Pool. (ADDMR. 37, Deposition JoAn Ball, pg. 37, 
ll. 18-25; pg. 38 11. 1-25). Mr. Ball likewise supponed this observation when he testified about 
sidewalk cooditions i.n the winter, ''in the wintertime you've always got snow and ice." (ADDM R. 
7, Deposition John Frederick Ball, pg. 38, II. 20 -25; pg. 39, ll. 1-4). It is undisputed that Appell ams 
h.ad notice of the icy conditions on the morning Mrs. Ball fell because she witnessed a friend slip on 
the ice moments before her fall. (ADDM R. 8, Deposition John Frederic.le Ball, pg. 41. I!. ·l-25). 
Appellants attempt to create a gemrine issue of material facts by suggesting the City was 
negligent in maintaining I.he sidewalks through the use of speculative and unfounded statements. 
Specifically, Appellants torture Ms. Van Homs affidavil to support a conclusion that ice melt was 
not applied or was improperly applied because there was no visual evidence of the ice melt. 
Appellan1s further ignore the unambiguous statements that Ms. Van Hom applied ice melt to the 
sidewalk and area where Mrs. BaU fell. AppeUants contention that Ms. Van Hom was required to 
apply ice melt in a non-negligent manner fails because it creates a new standard of care and ignores 
undisputed evidence th.at Ms. Van Horn applied ice melt on the sidewalks. 
The City had a duty to keep the sidewalks outside the Blackfoot Municipal Pool in a 
reasonably safe condition. The City acted reasonably by ensuring that snow was removed from the 
parking lot and sidewalks. The City then exceede<l its dllty by then applying ice melt to the 
sidewalks on three occassions. Appellants do not challenge that these actions occurred. The law is 
cJear that "[m]ere slipperiness of a sidewaJk, occasioned by smooth er level ice or snow, is 
IO 
insufficient to charge the municipality with liability for injury resulting therefrom where the snow 
or ice does not constitute an obstruction. Simply put, ice and snow that is level does not constitute 
an obstruction and the Cily cannot be liable for injuries that occur when an individual slips on 
smooth ice or snow. Maintaining a sidewalk free of .ell snow and ice at all times durm.g the harsh 
Eastern Idaho winters is virtually impossible, as th.is Court recognized; "_it would be burdensome, 
if not impracticable, to impose the duty on the municipality to keep its sidewalks clear of snow and 
ice at all Limes." Pearson, 80 [daho at 496. 
Moreover, Appe1lants must establish through appro:priate affidavit testimony that the City 
did not exercise reasonable care to maintain its street.6 and sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition. 
The only facts in the record on sidewalk maintenance, which were undisputed by appropriate 
affidavit testimony, is that the City plowed the snow from its streets and sidewalks and that the C1ly 
spread ice melt on the subject sjdewalk on three occasions the morning of the accident. (R. 34). It 
is important to remember that the standard is whether the City took reasonable actions in maintaining 
the sidewalks. Appellants faile<l to present any evidence suggesting that the City acted unreasonably. 
Rat.ber, Appellants contend th.a.t·because Mrs. Ball fell, that the City must have acted negligently. 
Appellants have an obligation in opposing a summary judgment motion 10 come forward with more 
than just "mere allegations" that the City breached the estab[ishe<l duty of care. See Idaho R. Civ. 
P. 56(e). No supporting evidence can be found in lhe record. 
Appellants do not dispute that the City removed the snow from the streets and sidewalks. 
Appellants further do not dispute that ice melt was applied on three occasions prior to the accident. 
Appellants only evidence supporting their .claim is the affidavits of Fred Ball, Joan Ball, Jeanette 
Merrifield and Shauna Justeson, all of which contain inadmi~ible testimony that was the subj eel of 
l l 
a separa1e motion to strike before the district court. The Court decl.ined to rule on that motion 
because the affidavit testimony was immaterial to the resolution of the case. (R. 184). As such, it 
would be improper for this Court to consider the statements which were subject 10 an undecided 
motion to strike. 
Nonetheless, even the Appellants' proposed affidavit testimony falis shor1 of creating a 
genuine issue of material fact sufficient to avo.id summary judgment. One fact repeated throughout 
lhe affidavits is that there was "no visible evidence" that ice melt had been applied to the sidewalk 
where Mrs. Bal1 felt This testimony is speculative, lay opinion testimony which is insuificient 
support for summary judgment. Even if it is not excluded, it does not represent tbe correct standard 
that a City must meet. The City does not have to demonstrate "visible evidence" of ice melt having 
been applied to aU city sidewalks at all time.s. The CityonJy has to demonstrate that it took measures 
to keep the sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition. The mere fact that there was not "visible 
evidence" of ice melt in the place where Joan Ball fell is not a su fficieot fact to create a genuine issue 
of fact for trial on the duty question. 
In considering the a.ffi.davi to f Jeanette Merrifield, her statements corroborate Ms. Van Hom's 
claims that ice melt was actually applied . Merrifield testified that the sidewalk was "wet looking" 
at the place where Ms. Ball fell. (R. 60). If that is the case, then the implication is thal ice melt must 
have been applied or the sidewalk would have appeared to be ice covered instead of "wet loolcing." 
Perhaps the most glaring deficiency in AppeHants opposition is that there has been no 
testimony, expert or otherwise, presented that more extensive measures needed to have been taken 
by the City to keep its sidewalks in a reasonably safe condition. In fact, there is no evidence in the 
record that the actions taken by the City did not rise to the level of reasonah!e. Under Idaho Rule 
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of Civil Procedure 56( e), "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that 
party's pleadings, but the party's response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must 
set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." As the record stands, 
Appellants failed to provide sufficient facts by affidavit in opposition to the City's summary 
judgment motion to create a genuine issue of fact with regard to the City's duty. If anything, 
Appellants merely relied on the allegations in their complaint. The only testimony provided by the 
affidavits is improper lay opinion testimony regarding whether ice melt was visible at the site of the 
accident. Based upon the lack of proper evidence in opposition to the City's motion for summary 
· judgment, dismissal of Appellants' negligence claims were appropriate. 
C. THERE IS NO EVlDENCR THAT THERE WAS A DEFECT IN THE SIDEWALK 
WHERE MRS. BALL FELL. 
Although thinly veiled, Appellants suggest that the sidewalk and landscaping were defocti ve 
and the cause of the slippery condition. (See Appellan1s Brief, p. 10). 1n support of this conclusion, 
Appellants relied exclusively on the lay testimony of Mr. Ball. Mr. Ball attempted to testify that the 
slope of the sidewall<: coupled with the manner in which the snow was shoveled resulted in an 
increased risk of ice accumulation, however, there is no foundation for this testimony, and pursuant 
to the City's motion to strike should have been stricken from the record .. The lay testimonyprcvided 
does not create an issue of fact that the City's snow removal was negligent. The Appellants failed 
to present any expert testimony that the sidewalk was defective in any fashion. When compared with 
the testimony of Rex Orgill, the Black.foot City Building Official, there is no question that the 
sidewall<: and landscape in question was designed according to industry standard, and was not 
defective in any way. Mr. Orgill specifically testified that he inspected the sidewalk in front of the 
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pool and that the sidewalk complied with construction standards. (ADDM 11, Affidavit of Rex 
Orgill, , 5). He further testified that the sidewalk was in satisfactory condition and did not show 
signs of spaulding or weathering and that the walkway still had adequate abrasiveness to provide for 
non-slip walking surface during wet weather. (ADDM 11, Affidavit of Rex Orgill, 15). He also was 
unable to find any tripping hazards that exceeded ADA requirements. (ADDM 11, Affidavit of Rex 
Orgill, ,r 5). Jn sum, it is undisputed that the sidewalks and surrounding landscaping is not defective. 
Further, the City is constrained as to where it can place snow. Snow cannot be left in the street, it 
must be removed from the streets and sidewalks to ensure that there are no obstructions. 
In this case, the supporting affidavits established that the snow had been pushed off the road 
and across the sidewalk to the grass. There is no evidence that this was negligent. Any argument 
tha't the City's sidewalks and landscaping was defective and contributed to the slippery condition was 
unsupported and dismissal was appropriate. 
V. ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL 
Pursuant to Idaho AppeBate Rule 41, the City seeks an award of attorney fees in accordance 
with Idaho Code Section 12-117. Section 12-117 provides for a city to recover attorney fees when 
"the party against whom the judgment is rendered acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." 
Under the statutes, the City is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal inasmuch the appeal 
has been brought frivolously, in bad faith, and without foundation. 
Case law has held that an appeal is deemed frivolous when a party fails to make a legitimate 
showing that the trial court misapplied the law. Bowlesv. Pro lndiviso, Inc. 132 Idaho 371,973 P.2d 
142 (1999). In this case, there is no legitimate argument that the trial court misapplied the law. The 
Appellants do not allege anything factually differentthan the claims alleged inPearson. Conversely, 
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the Splinter case, upon which Appellants rely, is inapplicable to the case at bar and cannot be 
reasonably deemed to overcome the clear import of Pearson and its effect on this case. The City 
therefore requests an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Pearson v. Boise Cifyrendered the Appellants' complaint ripe for summary judgment. There 
is undisputed evidence that the City removed the snow from the parking lot and sidewalks at the 
Blackfoot Municipal Pool and that ice melt was applied on at least three occasions prior to Mrs. 
Ball's fall. The City exercised ordinary and reasonably care in maintaining the sidewalks outside 
the Bingham County Pool in a reasonably safe condition, and Appellants failed to present any 
evidence to suggest otherwise. The City therefore requests that the district court's decision granting 
summary judgment and dismissing the complaint be affinned. 
DA TED this~ day of August, 2011. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I served a true copy of tl1e foregoing document upon the following th is 
~day of August, 2011, by hand delivery, mailing with the necessary postage affixed thereto, 
facsimile, or overnight mail. 
David K Penrod 
MAGUIRE & P'E~~OD 
1414 B, Center 
P.O. Box 47 58 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4758 
Pax: (208) 232-5181 
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